Abstract-A secure communication game is considered for the two-user MISO Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, where each transmitter aims to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other transmitter. In this novel problem, the weaker link tries to minimize the extra secret information obtained by its adversary, while the stronger link attempts to maximize it. We provide an information theoretic formulation for this non-cooperative zero-sum game scenario and determine that, under the assumption of Gaussian signaling at the transmitters, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium solution for the proposed problem. Moreover, we obtain in closed-form the optimal strategies (beamformers) at the transmitters that result in the Nash equilibrium. While the NE strategies are achievable in one shot when full channel state information is available at the transmitters (CSIT), we also propose an iterative step-by-step algorithm that converges to the NE point, but only requires limited CSIT. Numerical results are presented to illustrate the analytical findings and to study the role of different channel parameters on the NE strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION

R
ECENT information-theoretic research on secure communication has focused on enhancing security at the physical layer. The wiretap channel, first introduced and studied by Wyner [1] , is the most basic physical layer model that captures the problem of communication security. This work led to the development of the notion of perfect secrecy capacity, which quantifies the maximum rate at which a transmitter can reliably send a secret message to its intended recipient, without it being decoded by an eavesdropper. The Gaussian wiretap channel, in which the outputs of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are corrupted by additive white Gaussian noise, was studied in [2] . The secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel, which is in general a difficult non-convex optimization problem, has been addressed and solved for in [3] - [7] .
Given the adversarial nature of the wiretap channel and related scenarios with eavesdroppers, many researchers have proposed approaches based on game theory. A physical layer security game is introduced for the MIMO wiretap channel in [8] , where the wiretapper possesses the dual capability to act either as a passive eavesdropper or as an active jammer. In [9] - [13] , a wiretap channel with an external helper is considered, where the friendly jammer transmits a jamming signal to interfere with the eavesdropper. The problem of finding the optimal jamming power for the helper is formulated via two auction games in [11] , assuming the friendly jammer as the auctioneer and the sources as the bidders. Coalition formation games are applied in [12] to improve the physical layer security of wireless nodes through cooperation among the transmitters. In [13] , a Stackelburg game is used to investigate the interactions between the transmitter and different friendly jammers, in the presence of an eavesdropper. In [14] , zero-sum games are considered for the case that the external jammer helps the eavesdropper by relaying the information signal and/or transmitting interference.
Game theory approaches have also been proposed for the so-called interference channel (IFC). The IFC refers to the case where multiple communication links are simultaneously active in the same time and frequency slot, and hence potentially interfere with or leak information to each other. The most general case for the two-user IFC with confidential messages, where each receiver potentially acts as an eavesdropper for the other link, was studied in [15] where the authors imposed a perfect secrecy constraint for the discrete memoryless interference channel and obtained inner and outer bounds for the perfect secrecy capacity region. They also derived the achievable secrecy rate regions of several simple transmission schemes for single-input single-output (SISO) Gaussian interference channels.
In [16] , the Gaussian IFC was considered from a game theoretic perspective with transmitters as selfish players and secrecy rates as utility functions, where each transmitter wishes to maximize its own utility function. An iterative algorithm was proposed to compute the Nash Equilibrium (NE), which corresponds to the operating point where none of the players (transmitters) can improve its situation by unilaterally changing its strategy. Special game setups for the IFC with secrecy constraints are addressed in [17] , [18] . In [17] , a cognitive radio scenario is considered where only the message from the primary transmitter is considered confidential and must be kept secret at the cognitive receiver. While the primary transmitter and receiver employ a single-user wiretap channel encoder and decoder, respectively, the strategy of the cognitive transmitter is power allocation on the non-secure cognitive message and the noise signal [17] . For this scenario, the NE is established for the case that all nodes have a single-antenna (SISO). In [18] , a twouser one-sided interference channel with confidential messages is considered, in which one transmitter-receiver pair is interference-free. For this scenario, the NE for the binary deterministic channel is determined. In [19] , we investigated an arbitrary two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) Gaussian interference channel with confidential messages, and studied the achievable secrecy rate region for both non-cooperative and cooperative approaches based on game-theoretic bargaining.
In this paper, we consider a two-user MISO Gaussian interference channel where each multi-antenna transmitter desires to send independent and confidential information to its single-antenna intended recipient, while the other receiver potentially acts as an eavesdropper. For this scenario, we study the case that each transmitter wishes to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other link. We show that for this utility function, there exists a unique Nash Equilibrium under the assumption that the transmitters use Gaussian signaling. We also derive a closed-form expression for the optimal strategies (beamforming vectors) at the transmitters that result in the NE solution.
A utility function based on the secrecy rate difference between the two IFC users could arise for example in a tactical military scenario where the two transmitters are adversaries simultaneously sending data from the battlefield back to a command and control center. An approach that only maximized the difference between the standard data rates of the two users would not be appropriate since, even if Link 1 experienced a low data rate, a lack of security in Link 2's message may allow receiver 1 access to high rate information anyway. Furthermore, an approach that simply attempted to maximize each user's secrecy rate wouldn't necessarily provide an advantage over the adversary, who might also be able to achieve a high secrecy rate as well. Instead, we focus on the case where the weaker link tries to minimize the extra secret information obtained by its adversary, while the stronger link attempts to maximize it. In particular, suppose that Link 1 has an advantage over Link 2; in other words, if transmitter 1 (Tx1) acts rationally, it will be able to achieve a higher secrecy rate than Tx2. By maximizing the secrecy rate difference, Tx1 maximizes the amount of additional secret information that it is able to send over a given period of time compared with Tx2. On the other hand, Tx2 minimizes the secrecy rate difference in order to reduce the extra secret information that Tx1 sends. If the IFC scenario is (slowly) time varying, Tx2 could hope that at some future time, the channel conditions will reverse themselves, and it may be able to obtain an advantage and reduce the gap in secret information. If Tx2 had focused solely on maximizing its own secrecy rate without concern for the secrecy of Tx1, the secret information gap it would have to overcome would be much larger. From Tx1's perspective, it wants to maximize the gap as much as possible, so that if the channel conditions become less favorable, there is a wider gap for Tx2 to overcome.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model for the Gaussian MISO interference channel and formulate the problem to be solved. In Section III, we determine the existence and uniqueness of the NE and derive the optimal beamformers at the transmitters that achieve the NE solution. Numerical results in Section IV are presented to illustrate the proposed solution. Finally, Section V concludes the paper.
Notation: Boldface lowercase letters are used to denote column vectors. Vector-valued random variables are written with non-boldface uppercase letters (e.g., ), while the corresponding boldface lowercase letter denotes a specific realization of the random variable. Scalar variables are written with non-boldface (lowercase or uppercase) letters. The Hermitian (i.e., conjugate) transpose is denoted by , the matrix trace by Tr(.), and indicates an identity matrix. The Euclidean norm of the vector is written as , mutual information between the random variables and is denoted by , and represents the complex circularly symmetric Gaussian distribution with zero mean and variance .
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider the two-user Gaussian interference channel shown in Fig. 1 , where transmitter 1 with antennas and transmitter 2 with antennas intend to send independent and confidential messages and to single-antenna receivers 1 and 2, respectively. The mathematical model for the signals at the two receivers is given by:
(1) (2) where is the signal vector from transmitter , is additive white Gaussian noise at receiver , and the column vectors and represent complex channel gains from transmitter to its intended receiver and its eavesdropper, respectively. The signal power at transmitter is constrained by (3) where is the covariance matrix of the th transmitted signal. We assume that all channels are fixed throughout the entire transmission period, and to begin with, we assume all channels are known to both transmitters. Later, we will consider an approach to deal with the case where limited channel state information is available.
Transmitter 1 (Tx1) attempts to keep its message for receiver 1 (Rx1) confidential from receiver 2 (Rx2), and vice versa. The corresponding information-theoretic secrecy constraint is given by [15] ( 4) where is the number of channel uses required for transmitter to send message , and is the output at receiver , whose realizations for a given set of inputs are given by (1), (2) . Theorem 2 of [15] provides the achievable secrecy rates for the IFC with confidential messages:
over all where the pre-coding auxiliary random variables and (which are independent), represent two independent stochastic encoders.
We study a competitive game where each player (transmitter) aims to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other link. We only consider the non-trivial case where both transmitters have positive secrecy rates, i.e., and . If the strategy chosen by transmitter leads to , then under our assumed framework, transmitter would have no reason to transmit information, and would presumably change its role to that of a jammer and only broadcast artificial noise to minimize , . Since this case no longer corresponds to an IFC with confidential messages, this will lead to a different game formulation and thus we do not consider this case here. Thus, for Tx1 the utility function is , which using (5), (6) is given by
While Tx1 chooses a strategy that maximizes (7), Tx2 tries to minimize it, or equivalently maximize its own utility function . Since the sum of the utility functions for the two players is zero, this non-cooperative competitive game is a zero-sum game [20] . Thus, at the Nash Equilibrium, where no player can improve its utility by unilaterally changing its strategy, we must have: (8) (9) where represents the optimal pre-coding random variable at transmitter for the NE solution.
Eqs. (8), (9) state that if this game has an equilibrium solution, the max-min and min-max strategies will be the same, and both will yield the strategy profile . In other words, the NE strategy for player (transmitter) corresponds to the best move for Tx when Tx must move first and choose its strategy only once, assuming that Tx plays next, knows Tx 's strategy and chooses a strategy that minimizes Tx 's utility function [21] . To solve (8) , (9) in the most general case, one would need to determine the optimal signaling distribution for , as well as th optimal choice for prefix random variables . While these are still open problems for the IFC, the following lemma establishes that under the assumption of Gaussian signaling, prefix coding at the transmitters is not required, a result that will allow us to obtain a direct solution for the NE.
Lemma 1: Under the assumption of Gaussian signaling at the transmitters, a Gaussian is an optimal solution at transmitter to achieve the NE point in (8), (9) .
Proof: We will show the optimality of . Writing the mutual information in terms of entropy, i.e.,
, from (8) we have (10) Since is Gaussian, (10) represents the single-letter expression for the secrecy capacity of a Gaussian wiretap channel [6] . It has been shown, for example in [3] , that for the Gaussian wiretap channel, a Gaussian yields an optimal solution. A description similar to that above would also apply to Tx2 for the optimality of a Gaussian at the NE point. Lemma 1 indicates that to achieve the NE point for the proposed Gaussian IFC, the transmitters do not need to apply prefix coding. Thus a matrix characterization of the optimization problem (8) , (9) can be given as follows (where as mentioned above we have assumed that both users achieve positive non-zero secrecy rates):
(11) (12) where the non-convex optimization problems are solved under the power constraint given in (3), and we have assumed without loss of generality that . Consider for example Tx1 in problem (11) . One can easily confirm that for a given , the optimum that maximizes (11) also solves the following problem (13) The problem in (13) is equivalent to a simple MISO Gaussian wiretap channel, where the equivalent "noise" at the receiver and the eavesdropper is Gaussian with variances and , respectively. It is proved in [4] and [22, Theorem 3] that for the standard MISO Gaussian wiretap channel, the optimal that achieves the secrecy capacity is rank-one. More precisely, Gaussian signaling in the form of beamforming is optimal [4] . Thus, to achieve the Nash equilibria for the interference channel, the transmit signal at Tx1 must be represented as where is a Gaussian encoded information symbol broadcast by Tx1 using the beamforming vector
. A description similar to that above would also apply to Tx2, i.e.,
. Without loss of generality, we normalize to have unit length, , so that for , 2. Using the above facts, the optimization problem in (11), (12) can be rewritten as (14) ( 15) where is given by (16) Note that in problems (14), (15) we have used the fact that to achieve the NE solution, each transmitter must transmit at its maximum power. This results from the observation that, to achieve the secrecy capacity of the equivalent wiretap channel (given for example by (13) for Tx1), the transmitter uses its maximum power, as shown in [22, App. A] . From now on, for notational simplicity we omit the scalar by absorbing it into the channel vector:
Thus, can be rewritten as
III. NASH EQUILIBRIUM STRATEGY
For the MISO Gaussian interference channel in which we are interested, each transmitter aims to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other link. In order to show that there exists a Nash equilibrium for this scenario, we need to show that there exists a pair of beamforming vectors for which problems (14) and (15) are simultaneously satisfied. It should be noted that since is a non-convex function of and , problems (14) and (15) are different.
A. Critical Points of
Referring to problems (14) and (15), we have: Lemma 2: Any that maximizes for a given , and any which minimizes for a given , must have the following form 1 : (20) where denotes the orthogonal projection onto span and denotes the projection onto its orthogonal complement.
Proof: The proof follows exactly the same steps as Corollary 1 in [23] .
Let denote the angle between , which is given by (21) 1 Clearly, for any real-valued would also be acceptable.
Using (20), we have:
Define (24) ( 25) and then use (22)- (25) in (19) to rewrite as (26) Thus, based on Lemma 2, the optimization problems (14), (15) can be reparameterized in terms of simply the angles :
To obtain the Nash equilibria, we must find a pair of angles for which problems (27), (28) are simultaneously satisfied. Our approach to finding the NE is as follows: we first find the critical point of , namely , where the first-order partial derivatives are equal to zero. Then we show that , where the pair is the concurrent solution of (27), (28), and gives the optimal beamformers for the transmitters at the NE point. which gives the final result and completes the proof.
B. Optimality of the Critical Point in Achieving the Nash Equilibria
C. Discussion
Using Theorem 3, we have closed form expressions for the optimal strategies at the transmitters for the NE as follows (39) (40) where is found as explained in Theorem 1. Note that the corresponding optimal beamformer at transmitter , , is obtained by replacing in the RHS of (20) . Referring to (39) and (40), we have the following observations about the NE strategies : 1) Since the utility function has only one critical point in the range of , and since any NE point is a critical point by the KKT conditions, the NE strategies for each user, given by (39), (40), are unique.
2) The optimal NE strategy for either transmitter is a function of , , and for , 2. The quantities and only depend on the average transmit power and the norms of the channel vectors and , as shown in (17), (18) and (24), (25) . Thus, any set of channel vectors for which , and remain unchanged will lead to the same NE solution . For example, the two sets of channel vectors shown in Fig. 2 result in the same solution. While is unchanged in such cases, the actual beamforming vectors and will be different. 3) Consider, for example, Tx1. From (39), one can easily confirm that there are two cases for which the optimal NE strategy at Tx1, defined by , is completely independent of the system parameters at Tx2 . These special cases are and , which result in and , respectively. In this situation, the corresponding optimal NE beamformer at Tx1, , is in the direction of , either orthogonal to (for ) or parallel to it (for ). 4) Finally, from (5), (6) , one can easily confirm that the secrecy rate of transmitter at the Nash equilibrium point is given by (41)
D. Iterative Algorithm
In the above sections, we have fully characterized the NE point in closed-form assuming both transmitters have full channel state information (CSI), or in other words knowledge of for , 2. Under this assumption, the transmitters can both use Theorem 1 to calculate their respective transmit beamformer , and the NE operating point is achieved in one shot. In the discussion that follows, we discuss how the NE can still be achieved in situations where only limited CSI (defined below) is available to each transmitter. A "best response" iterative algorithm is presented where each transmitter alternately chooses its beamformer to maximize the secrecy rate difference given the adversary's current choice of its own transmit beamformer. As we showed earlier using (11)-(13), this problem is equivalent to maximizing the secrecy rate of a certain MISO Gaussian wiretap channel, and the solution can be obtained in closed-form using, for example, the approach of [4] . Although full CSIT is not available, we will assume (see below) that sufficient CSIT is at hand for solving this equivalent wiretap problem. The algorithm is presented below assuming without loss of generality that Tx1 updates its transmit strategy ( or equivalently ) first.
1) Set
. Initialize and (for example , i.e. or ) 2) Tx1 chooses its "best response" by maximizing its utility function, which is equivalent to (13) . In order to solve (13), Tx1 requires knowledge of vectors and and scalars and . We assume that Rx1 feeds back and its current SINR to Tx1, and that Rx2 feeds back and to Tx2. From Rx1's transmission, Tx1 can obtain and . By listening to Rx2's transmissions, Tx1 can obtain and it can also deduce the scalar by intercepting Rx2's SINR feedback, since with knowledge of , Tx1 is aware of the interference it produces at Rx2. Since Tx1 only needs to solve (13) at this stage, it does not require explicit knowledge of and , and thus the assumption of full CSI is relaxed. Note that the corresponding to the optimal solution of (13) is uniquely characterized using an argument similar to that made in Appendix B in obtaining (63).
3)
is updated by repeating the previous step for Tx2 given the covariance computed by Tx1 in the previous step. 4) Increment . Repeat steps 2 and 3 until both transmitters perceive a small enough difference in the transmit parameters of their opponent:
(42) Convergence is guaranteed for the above algorithm based on a well-known result for the two-player zero-sum game, where if each player keeps playing its "best response," then the process will ultimately converge to the NE point [26] . More precisely, similar to the argument made in [16] , since the best response for each player is unique in its strategy space, and since the strategy space for each player is closed and bounded, the algorithm converges to the unique NE point, whose existence we have already established. As we will illustrate in the next section, convergence is typically achieved in a small number of iterations, even when the number of antennas at the transmitters is large. Note that the best response for each transmitter is chosen in steps I and II by assuming an IFC scenario, even though prior to convergence the transmitters are not transmitting simultaneously and technically an IFC is not present. For example, Tx1 solves (13) for its best response, where (13) comes from (11) which is the utility function for Tx1 under an IFC system model. This is not a problem since ultimately, upon convergence, both transmitters will be active at the same time and an IFC results.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate our theoretical findings. For the first example, we assume , . The channel vectors are 2 , , , . One can easily confirm that in this example, and . Fig. 3 shows the track of NE points when changes from 0.01 to 58.75. For each , we obtain the optimal NE strategies from (39), (40), and consequently calculate the secrecy rates at the NE point as given by (41). The direction of the arrows shows how the NE points change as increases; when the NE is at point and when the NE is at point . The game provides a maximum secrecy rate for Tx2 when , corresponding to point on the curve. However, we see that increasing beyond 3.94 results in the game providing a lower secrecy rate for Tx2. In this case, a greater secrecy advantage for Tx2, measured in terms of , is obtained by using additional power at Tx2 to reduce the secrecy rate achieved by Tx1. One can verify that is monotonically increasing with , even if is not. For , the game results in , and one would have to consider an alternative strategy space for Tx2 that included jamming Tx1 in order to further reduce . In the next example, Fig. 4 , we retain the system parameters of the first example, except , which results in , i.e., . Here changes from 0.01 to 5000. This example is of special interest because when , we have , as given by (40) and mentioned in Section III-C-3. In other words, for any , the best that Tx2 can do in maximizing is to simply maximize its secrecy rate by using a beamformer orthogonal to , i.e., . When is very large, the NE appears to converge to a point where the secrecy rate is fixed and independent of . This is due to the fact that, when , function is given by Clearly, as , the choice of cannot considerably affect the second log term. Thus, when , the best that Tx1 can do is maximize the first log term by choosing , i.e., . The above point is an important observation which completes the discussion in Section III-C-3. When and , the optimal NE strategy at both transmitters is given by or , , 2. Clearly, the same statement holds for the case that and . Consequently, the NE point is given by However it should be noted that, while for the optimal NE strategy at Tx2 always results in a secrecy rate when , if or equivalently , this game would result in , and since the problem would no longer be an IFC, the NE strategies would no longer be valid. In the next example, Fig. 5 , we consider the joint effect of and on the Nash equilibrium point. The channel vectors are the same as those in the first example. In Fig. 5 , each curve corresponds to a given and shows the track of NE points when changes from 0.01 to 100. The direction of the arrows shows how the NE points change as increases. The figure shows that for , Tx1 has to shut down to maximize when . The figure shows that, as expected, for any , increases with . Similarly, for a given , increases with . In Fig. 6 , we consider the joint effect of and on the NE point. We assume and , where changes from 0 to . The other channel vectors are unchanged from the first example. Each curve corresponds to a given value of , and the direction of the arrows shows how the NE points change when is increased from 0 to . We see that for this example, changing causes the NE points to move on a line whose slope appears to be independent of . The slope of the line is greater than one, so while both and increase, increases as well. In Fig. 7 , we compute the average NE points using (41) for Rayleigh fading channels, where the entries of the channel vectors are independent and distributed as . In this example we assume and . The figure shows the location of the average NE points over 10000 realization as changes from 2 to 8 and either or . The direction of the arrows shows how the NE points change as increases. As increases when is fixed, the secrecy rate at the NE point improves for Tx1 and decreases for Tx2. When the number of antennas at both transmitters increases, the achieved secrecy rate at the NE point for both transmitters increases as well. Fig. 8 shows the average number of iterations for the algorithm in Section III-D to converge to the NE point for the previous example. Here we set the convergence tolerance as . As the figure shows, even when the number of antennas at the transmitters is large, the iterative algorithm almost always converges in less than 3 iterations. Interestingly, the figure shows that when , the average number of iterations for convergence is less than when . Finally Fig. 9 compares NE operating points for different applications, where the channel parameters are:
, , , and . The figure shows the achievable rate (red) and secrecy rate (blue) regions [23] , as well as a sample of achievable rate points within each region denoted by red and blue circles. The axes show either the achieved rate or secrecy rate for each user, depending on whether or not secrecy constraints are considered. The figure also shows the location of three key NE operating points: the NE point without secrecy constraints , where each transmitter wants to maximize its own rate 3 , the NE point where each transmitter wants to maximize its own secrecy rate , and the NE point proposed in this paper where each transmitter aims to maximize the difference between its own secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other link
. To obtain , one can use the iterative algorithm proposed in [16] . Note that the fact that dominates does not imply that is an "inferior" operating point, since the two equilibria are based on different definitions of the utility function.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have characterized the Nash Equilibrium solution for the MISO Gaussian interference channel where each link aims to maximize the difference between its secrecy rate and the secrecy rate of the other link. We showed that when the transmitters employ Gaussian signaling, the game has a unique Nash equilibrium based on the use of beamforming at the transmitters. We obtained closed-form solutions for the beamformers employed by the transmitters at the NE point, and illustrated the resulting secrecy rate behavior via several numerical examples. While the NE can be found in one shot when full CSI is available to the transmitters, we also showed that an iterative algorithm can converge to the NE when only limited CSI is available. Now by applying Lemma 3 on the pencil (60), one can confirm that the optimal that maximizes (59) is given by (62) where, for example, becomes
Going back to problem (58), it is clear that , corresponding to , is the optimal that maximizes and is given by (63) at the top of the page, where and . In (63), we used the fact that and , where , and are defined in (21)- (25) . Note that, besides the system parameters , and , in (63) is a function of which itself is a function of the realvalued parameter obtained in Theorem 1. Recall that the main purpose of this appendix is to prove (57); i.e., we must show that for the given in Theorem 1, , where is given by (29). Comparing (29) and (63), it is clear that to prove , one must show the following equality holds for the value of obtained in Theorem 1:
To show this, we first obtain a polynomial equation for the that satisfies (64). Then we show that the polynomial equation for the satisfying (64) is exactly the same polynomial equation that returns the desired value of given in Theorem 1.
From (64) where the coefficients are exactly the same coefficients that represent the fourth degree polynomial equation defined in (32), and are given by (52)-(56).
Note that (68) has 6 roots, two of which are complex and clearly unacceptable 4 . Thus the root of interest for which (64) holds is among the roots of the fourth degree polynomial equation with the coefficients . Since in obtaining (68) through (66), (67) we used the properties of the defined in Theorem 1, and since we reached the same polynomial equation as in Theorem 1, this clearly shows that the equality in (64) must hold.
Consequently or
Following the same steps as those above, we can show that which completes the proof of Theorem 2.
